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CARBON ALLOWANCES: A NEW WAY OF
SEEING AN INVISIBLE ASSET
Rachel Feinberg Harrison*
I. INTRODUCTIONON September 25, 2008, the United States held its first carbon al-
lowance auction.' The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) developed the auction in New York, one of its member
states, and it was overseen by Potomac Economics, RGGI's independent
market monitor.2 In this auction, all of the allowances offered for sale
were sold, totaling 12,565,387 allowances at a price of $3.07, each raising
almost $38.6 million for the states involved. 3 The success of the second
auction, held on December 17, 2008, surpassed those levels, selling
31,505,898 allowances at a price of $3.38 per allowance. 4 This auction
raised about $106.5 million for the growing number of member states.5
The chair noted that
The RGGI auctions continue to be the place where market partici-
pants come to buy the allowances they need .... Once again the
results prove that distributing allowances via auctions in a carbon
dioxide cap and trade program can be successful. We look forward to
developing a partnership with the Obama Administration to create a
strong federal climate action plan.6
Because of the success of the RGGI auctions combined with the stated
goals of the Obama administration, national attention has indeed turned
to creating a uniform national policy on climate change, with a specific
focus on carbon trading.7 As the issue hits the national stage, however,
the debate has been confused by the two-sided approach of cap and trade
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2010. Thanks to all of my friends
and family for their unwavering support through this endeavor-Mom, Dad, Gretchen,
Abigail, Bo, Exec., and the study buddies.
1. Press Release, Reg'l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc., RGGI States' CO2 Auction
Continues Strong Performance (Dec. 19, 2008) (announcing that "[a]uction with [aill [t]en
[sitates [b]uilds on [s]uccess of the [f]irst [a]uction as [a]ll [aillowances [slold at a [c]learing
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versus carbon tax. Though there is surely a certain level of semantic and
political spin within the dichotomy, it does touch on the real issue of what
kind of asset and market system is created by carbon trading.
In this Comment, I will examine the background, current manifesta-
tion, and implications of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. In Part
II, I will discuss the issue of climate change and the debate that has
brought it to the fore of law, litigation, and policy. I will look to the
reactions to and efforts by the United States, the United Nations, and the
European Union. I will particularly examine previous efforts at cap and
trade markets and regulation instituted in the United States. From there,
I will lay out how those programs were first followed and amended by the
European Union and its member states to combat rising greenhouse gas
emissions. Lastly, I will lay out the impetus for the foundation of the
RGGI in the United States. In Part III, I will more specifically examine
the current manifestations of the RGGI, in an attempt to clarify the pro-
cess and intricacies of the allowance auctions and the secondary market
thereby created. In Part IV, I will look to the secondary market and the
secondary legal implications of a cap and trade mechanism for carbon
allocation. Here, the nature of the carbon asset will weigh heavily on the
future of the markets and the corporations involved. By necessity, we
must examine, not only the consequences of trading in pollutants, but
also the nature of the pollutant asset created-commodity, currency, se-
curity, UCC good, government permit, tax, or something which is some of
each and not completely any of the above. I conclude by determining
that it is important from a market and contractual point of view to see
carbon allocations under the category of UCC goods.
II. COMING TO TERMS WITH CLIMATE CHANGE
Though certainly climate change will impact the environment and the
multi-specied inhabitants of our planet, in this Comment I will stick to the
dollars and cents. It is important for corporations and investors to recog-
nize the impact that climate change will have on the economy. 8 As the
discussion of climate change shifts from debate to agreement and, hope-
fully, further to problem-solving, corporations will be compelled to get
involved and, likely will already have come to terms with their involve-
ment in climate change solutions.9
For many years climate change was framed, at least by the American
media and politicians, as a partisan debate, with some people highly con-
cerned by its certain existence and others doubtful that a problem even
8. See generally Elise N. Rindfleisch, Shareholder Proposals: A Catalyst for Climate
Change-Related Disclosure, Analysis, and Action?, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 45, 49 (2008)(specifically looking at and noting the growing success and frequency of "shareholder pro-
posals as mechanisms for securing disclosure, analysis, and action from corporations in the
area of climate change").
9. Id. at 47 (noting that "[b]usinesses can no longer afford to ignore climate change,




existed. More recently, a consensus belief in climate change seems to
have emerged.1 0 The U.S. Climate Change Science Program has asserted
with certainty that climate change will lead to "long-term physical
changes to the environment with potentially far-reaching conse-
quences."1 1 Some have claimed that "average global temperatures could
rise three to ten degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century."'1 2 These
findings in the United States were also reflected by those of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), who upgraded their belief
that the net effect of human activities has caused some kind of worldwide
warming to "very high confidence. '13 The IPCC further noted that car-
bon dioxide concentrations have grown 31% since 1750.14
Greenhouse gases are those which contribute to global warming condi-
tions. 15 There are six recognized greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, meth-
ane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride. 16 Unlike other pollutants, there are no "hot spots" '17 in
greenhouse gas emissions, in that an emission in any location affects
every location the same way as it does in the location where it is emit-
ted.18 For example, an emission in Dallas would affect Dallas to the same
degree that it would affect New Orleans, or San Francisco, or Tim-
buktu.19 Effectively limiting the growth of greenhouse gases and reduc-
ing their output will require a global response. Consequently, the United
Nations and the European Union have made comprehensive policy
changes.20
A. CORPORATE RESPONSE
Before addressing the policies set forth by government agencies, it is
necessary to note that many corporations have, in fact, recognized the
potential economic toll that the failure to address climate change may
10. Paul Bowden, EU Emissions Trading-Latest Developments, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 97, 99 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 2007) (noting the increased
recognition of climate change in the scientific and corporate arenas).
11. Jeffrey A. Smith, Disclosure of Climate Change Risks and Opportunities, in How
TO COMPLETE YOUR SECURITIES OFFERINGS ON A TIMELY BASIS 149, 151 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 13988, 2008).
12. Rindfleisch, supra note 8 at 47.
13. Bowden, supra note 10, at 99.
14. Joseph Allan MacDougald, Why Climate Law Must be Federal: The Clash Between
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and State Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L.
REV. 1431, 1435, 1451 (2008) (recognizing that because of the absence of stringent federal
greenhouse gas regulation, states have developed their own restrictions, which are inher-
ently inefficient without a broader plan).
15. Id. at 1435.
16. Kevin Doran & Alaine Ginnochio, United States Climate Policy: Using Market-
Based Strategies to Achieve Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L.
& POL'Y J. 31, 33-34, 51 (2008) (emphasizing the importance of "carbon pricing," but also
noting the need for comprehensive policies addressing climate change).
17. John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29
ENERGY L.J. 1, 1, 11 (2008) (explaining "the basic elements of climate change law").
18. MacDougald, supra note 14, at 1435.
19. See id.
20. See infra Part II.F.
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take.21 From a business standpoint, companies risk direct losses from cli-
mate change, specifically from physical impact and phenomena like
flooding and hurricanes. 22 As Professor Elise Rindfleisch points out, cor-
porate actors also risk the potential future costs of compliance. 23 Certain
industries will have to assume incredible financial obligations to meet the
potentially stringent regulations that the future may hold.24 In the more
immediate future, especially before a federal plan is implemented in the
United States, companies will have to deal with the cost of varied and
inconsistent programs in different regions.2 5 To hedge against these
likely future costs, some corporations have decided to create their own
programs to reduce emissions and have seen positive public response to
these efforts. 26 For example, GE created the Ecomagination campaign
with goals to reduce carbon emissions and provide eco-friendly products
to other countries.2 7 And BP has also managed to reduce its own carbon
emissions while increasing its profits.28
The corporate world has taken further efforts to recognize and police
the potential costs associated with climate change. For example, over
fifty white papers have been published by major investment banks specif-
ically addressing the issue of climate change.29 Additionally, in the Stern
Review, Sir Nicholas Stern asserts that waiting to stabilize greenhouse gas
emissions could eventually cost the United Kingdom 5-20% of its GDP,
while taking actions to deal with the problems now would only cost 1% of
its GDP.30 American corporations have begun to take part in voluntary
climate change disclosure, beginning a framework that could result in the
"privatization" of such disclosures.31 Currently in the United States, pri-
vate standards require more disclosures and stricter standards than those
required by the SEC.32 The private market has taken advantage of a void
in federal policy, creating "a wide variation in the depth, quality, and for-
mat of formal SEC reporting on climate change[ ] and . . .an unprece-
dented divergence between the scope and quality of mandatory reports
21. See Rindfleisch, supra note 8, at 47 (specifically mentioning General Electric and
BP).
22. Id. at 49-50.
23. Id. at 51.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 52. Rindfleisch further notes that an overarching federal program is
highly likely with the new makeup of the Congress. Id. at 51-52.
26. Id. at 47-48.
27. Id. at 47; see also GE: ecomagination, http://ge.ecomagination.com/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2009).
28. Rindfleisch, supra note 8, at 47-48.
29. Smith, supra note 11, at 152. Investment houses, like Barclays, have even become
involved in the RGGI submitting comments and opinions on proposed rules and proce-
dures. See generally Comments of Barclays Capital on RGGI Auction Design, submitted
by Steven Schleimer, Director, Energy & Envtl. Mkt. Regulation, Barclays Capital (Nov.
15, 2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/barclays-capital.pdf.
30. Bowden, supra note 10, at 99.




on the one hand and voluntary reports on the other. '33
As Peter Lehner notes, corporations must be involved in any climate
change program. 34 Without creating a cost in climate change or in carbon
emissions, corporations will have significantly less impetus to effect
change in their structure and goals.35 Essentially, climate change is a neg-
ative externality for which society as a whole pays, but for which no indi-
vidual company will see the cost.36 Lehner argues that we must change
the system in which corporations operate, asserting that "[t]he legal
framework is set by the laws within which corporations act. The institu-
tional and financial framework is the particular market in which corpora-
tions operate and the incentives established. '37 As such, governments
and policymakers have set out to "change the ground rules within which
companies are operating so the right incentives are sent throughout the
companies' operations" and further encourage corporations to take part
in climate change efforts. 38
B. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change binds its signatory countries to greenhouse gas limitations that
were enforceable beginning in 2005. 39 The United States, though a part
of the UN Framework Convention, has refrained from ratifying the Ky-
oto Protocol, and, therefore, is not tied to any international goals for lim-
iting greenhouse gases (GHG).40 Among the world's major developed
countries, only the United States has not joined the Kyoto Protocol signa-
tories.4 1 The program includes a broad, overall goal for the entire group
of signatory nations and goals for each individual party to be achieved
over the period of 2008-2012.42
The Kyoto Protocol allows for several methods of carbon reduction.43
In negotiations, the United States actively worked for the inclusion of a
market-based system to encourage the reduction of carbon emissions,
something similar to the cap and trade mechanisms that have been put
into place selectively since Kyoto.44 Kyoto sets out emissions trading as
one of four "flexible mechanisms" for emitters to achieve pollution re-
ductions at a lower cost.45 Emissions trading allows for a signatory party
33. Id.
34. Peter Lehner, Executive Dir., Natural Res. Def. Council, Keynote Address at the
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review Symposium: Changing Markets to Ad-
dress Climate Change (Oct. 25, 2007), in 35 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 385, 385 (2008).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 388.
37. Id. at 385.
38. Id. at 387.
39. Smith, supra note 11, at 151.
40. Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 17, at 9-10.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Bowden, supra note 10, at 100.
43. Id.
44. Dernbach & Kakade, supra note 17, at 10.
45. Bowden, supra note 10, at 100.
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to set an overall national cap on emissions allowances and then for these
allowances to be distributed to emitting parties through methods like al-
location or purchase.46 Carbon emissions may also be offset by Clean
Development Mechanisms, whereby a polluter may take on projects in
developing countries to reduce its emissions and use those reductions as
its own credits. 47 A third mechanism is Joint Implementation, which al-
lows operations in signatory countries to implement projects in other sig-
natory countries and use those reductions as credits. 48 The final
mechanism is Carbon Sinks, by which a corporation may offset its emis-
sions "by increasing the amount of greenhouse gases removed from the
atmosphere through forestry, land use and land use change." 49
The Kyoto Protocol creates a break between developed and developing
countries; corporations in developed countries tend to need to buy car-
bon and developing countries have carbon to sell.5 0 For example, cur-
rently about 42% of all credits and carbon reduction projects are based in
China, and it is likely that India will soon be included into this trend as
well.5 ' This feature allows for corporations based in countries like France
and Germany to overproduce their fair share of carbon emissions, but to
discount those numbers with projects and goals implemented in other
countries. In developing countries the price of reducing carbon is less, so
this is a cost-efficient mechanism for corporations to decrease their over-
all emission of carbon. Though, as other scholars have pointed out, this
becomes a problem when there is a question of shifting values of the car-
bon asset and whether that value should be equal from one country to the
next.
C. MARKET FORCES AND EMISSIONS
This Comment focuses its attention on cap and trade programs, but
there are other market options for managing emissions as well. First,
there is the potential for a credit-based mechanism that would give cred-
its to emitters who reduce their emissions more than what is required by a
regulatory base.52 An averaging program would allow high-volume emit-
ters to offset their total emissions output by reducing emissions from
other sources and so lowering the overall total.53 This method has the
advantage of allowing corporations to make their own determinations
with the flexibility of choosing not to reduce emissions from sources
46. Id. at 101.
47. Id. at 100-11.
48. Id. at 101.
49. Id.
50. Bill Westerfield et al., Panel Discussion at the Energy Bar Association Presenta-
tion, EBA Climate Change Primer: Cap and Trade (Nov. 30, 2007), in 29 ENERGY L.J. 173,
190 (2008) (statement of Jeff King, Credit Suisse) (discussing "design elements for a na-
tional cap trade system").
51. Id.
52. David Harrison, Jr. & Daniel Radov, Materials on Emissions Trading, in CLEAN
AIR: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 201, 238 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, 2007).
53. Id. at 239.
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where doing so might be undesirable or cost-prohibitive. 54
Cap and trade programs have been met by the greatest approval from
the general policy community, though opinions on the details of such a
program do vary to some extent.55 A cap and trade program works by
setting an overall cap on emissions for the state, region, country, or inter-
national consortium. 56 From this cap, a total number of emissions al-
lowances are determined with each allowance representing the right to
emit however much of a certain pollutant-in this instance, carbon. 57 Al-
locations may be distributed among corporations or emissions sources by
a government-set distribution mechanism or by auction. 58 Once the right
is held, it is an asset which a corporation may sell or trade freely in the
marketplace, allowing the entity to determine whether to emit or sell the
right to do so based on its own needs. 59 This kind of program capitalizes
on encouraging corporations to make their own decisions.
D. POLICY PROBLEMS IN A CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM
When market mechanisms are the methods for minimizing emissions,
market forces also provide incentives for corporations to go outside of
the program. As Joseph Allan MacDougald has explained, one of the
major problems that policymakers must deal with is leakage. 60 Leakage
occurs when power is imported from outside the regulated region from an
uncapped source, where energy production does not have the added cost
of compliance.61 Energy is purchased, brought into the regulated region,
and then sold in a price-inflated market to the advantage of the non-
complying source.62 Leakage may also occur in a slightly less conniving
situation, when the demand far exceeds that which the power grid is able
to provide but upgrading the system would be untimely, impracticable, or
too expensive. 63
Safety valves have also been implemented in the new RGGI system
because they have proven to be an important design issue in determining
the success of the program. 64 A safety valve sets the maximum price at
which allowances will be sold, limiting the potential for prices to escalate
54. Id.
55. Westerfield, supra note 50, at 174.
56. Id. at 176.
57. Harrison & Radov, supra note 52, at 239.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. MacDougald, supra note 14, at 1437.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1436-37.
63. Id. at 1437.
64. David Harrison, Jr., et al., Using Emissions Trading to Combat Climate Change:
Programs and Key Issues, in CLEAN AIR: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 155, 171 (ALI-
ABA Course of Study, 2008); Memorandum of Understanding from RGGI to the States of
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont




in times of intense power need or growth.65 As David Harrison, Jr. and
Daniel Radov explain, this feature allows for the political expediency of
minimizing costs in times when companies would be most affected by cost
increases. 66
E. AMERICAN CAP AND TRADE SYSTEMS
Part of the Kyoto plan allows for the institution of a cap and trade
system as an effort to allow market forces to control and minimize the
future emission of carbon.67 As stated above, the United States deemed
this facet important in the Kyoto negotiations and was largely based on
the United States' own success with cap and trade programs as a mecha-
nism to decrease pollution.68 Though the United States has been slow to
enter the world stage to deal with carbon emissions, with no federal re-
sponse mirroring the levels seen in Europe, the United States has previ-
ously implemented plans against other pollutants. 69 The United States,
specifically, and members of Kyoto have recognized the benefits of trad-
ing over other possible methods of reducing emissions. 70 Trading allows
for flexibility since corporations may choose to use the right to emit car-
bon or sell that right at a profit to someone else.71 Carbon trading
reduces the overall cost of the program, allowing market forces to man-
age the pollution rather than creating government bureaucracy to control
a rigid standard. 72 The program also does not require a bureaucracy to
determine the right to exceptions, again using the market process to pro-
vide efficiency in avoiding potential political hotbeds.73 Previous experi-
ence shows that a cap and trade program will work and that it, in fact,
provides a heightened level of certainty that the specific goals will be at-
tained. 74 Most importantly, each emitter is allowed to make its own deci-
sion as to what is most cost efficient-using the allowance or selling the
allowance-without interfering with state-mandated carbon emissions re-
duction goals.75
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States has
recognized the potential benefits of cap and trade programs and has pre-
viously implemented them to deal with acid rain and NOx. 7 6 In total, five
major cap and trade programs have been established in the United States,
65. Harrison & Radov, supra note 52, at 263.
66. Id.
67. Richard M. Schwartz & Donna Mussio, Environmental Due Diligence for Securi-
ties Offerings, in CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A AND SECURITIES OFFERINGS
2008, at 141, 165 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 14933, 2008).
68. Harrison & Radov, supra note 52, at 234.
69. Id.; Smith, supra note 11, at 151.






76. Id. at 242-44.
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excluding those thus far established in the carbon market.77 Most of these
have been administered by the EPA, with the exception of the Regional
Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) in Los Angeles which was ad-
ministered by the South Coast Air Quality Management District
(SCAQMD). 78 The acid rain program managed the deposition of wet sul-
fate mainly resulting from the emissions of power plants.79 The North-
east saw most of the problems that resulted from acid rain, which tends to
have localized or "hot spot" effects. 80 The program set out with an over-
all cap based on how much they believed emissions needed to be reduced,
which is stronger than a program that works backwards from allocation to
cap. 81 This program, along with the NOx cap program, both ultimately
cost the government less than expected. 82
From these programs, the United States and other governments have
recognized that a market-based program will incur less cost for business
and government bureaucracies, without sacrificing any of the program's
potential for success.83 In fact, the previous programs were able to re-
duce the targeted emissions to desired levels.84 Key to the success of
these efforts were four elements: (1) involvement of the entire sector; (2)
a cap set prior to allocating the pollutant; (3) monitoring; and (4) the
power of market forces. 85 In order for market forces and efficiency plans
to take hold, a cap and trade program must accommodate flexibility
through methods like banking and trading of allowances that are bal-
anced by fixed environmental targets and governmental refusal to raise
the cap or to allow for exceptions. 86
F. CARBON TRADING UNDER THE UN AND EU
With the American system of using market forces to regulate emissions
and the growing assumption that these market forces are appropriate to
manage pollutants as a backdrop, the European Union has implemented
a system to manage carbon. The European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) is tied to more stringent standards than any American
system because its members are also members of the Kyoto Protocol.87
Particularly, in Kyoto the EU committed to reducing its greenhouse gas
emission by 8% below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012.88 In 2003, the
EU established the ETS to try to create a cost-effective mechanism to
77. Id. at 242.
78. Id.
79. Westerfield et al., supra note 50, at 176 (statement of Brian McLean, Director,
EPA Office of Atmospheric Programs).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 179.
83. Harrison & Radov, supra note 52, at 247.
84. Id. at 247, 249.
85. Westerfield et al., supra note 50, at 179 (statement of Brian McLean, Director EPA
Office of Atmospheric Programs).
86. Harrison & Radov, supra note 52, at 250-53.
87. Westerfield et al., supra note 50, at 189 (statement of Jeff King, Credit Suisse).
88. Harrison & Radov, supra note 52, at 255.
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manage carbon emissions. 89 Currently the scheme only manages carbon
dioxide, but it may possibly extend to other greenhouse gases as well.90
The European system is mandatory and set up to operate in phases that
correspond with those laid out in Kyoto.91 Due to its mandatory nature,
operators of sources must hold GHG permits to emit carbon dioxide,
such that: (1) the amount sources can emit is governed by the number of
allowances they have; (2) sources are required to monitor and report
their emissions activities; (3) sources must surrender the same number of
allowances as that which they actually emit during each calendar year; (4)
sources, though, may bank any unused allowances to be used during the
phase in which they were accrued; and (5) a monetary penalty is assessed
for any emission over that for which the sources have allowances and the
sources must surrender that amount in allowances the following year. 92
Certain nations and companies have challenged their allocations and
credits.93 Slovakia, for example, initiated actions against a proposed cut
in its national cap.9 4 Slovakia initially had a relatively high cap, but it had
to close two nuclear power plants as part of joining the European
Union.95 Without those power plants, the country began using more fos-
sil fuels, thus needing an even greater cap to accommodate those new
emissions. 96 A Slovakian corporation affiliated with U.S. Steel also filed
suit to challenge the decision, arguing that these kinds of variations instill
the risk of uncertainty in the steel industry and could result in diminished
investment. 97 Three German-based corporations also initiated actions in
the European Court of First Instance, requesting that the court annul a
Commission decision on allocations.9 8 It argued that the decision had
directly and uniquely affected their business so as to provide standing.99
Further, they asserted that the Commission had missed relevant dead-
lines and had rejected their request for allocation guarantees advanced by
Germany without good reason.1 00 In the United Kingdom, Cemex chal-
lenged the allocation methods used, arguing that one of its plants would
be uniquely disadvantaged by the determination.1 0' They argued that
their allocation was set so low as to infringe on "the principles of equality
or non-discrimination under EU law. ' ' 10 2 This claim was ultimately re-
89. Id.
90. Bowden, supra note 10, at 101.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 102.
93. Id. at 108.
94. Id.
95. The EU's Faltering Cap-And-Trade System, http://roguepundit.typepad.com/
roguepundit/2007/01/the eus collaps.html (Jan. 29, 2007).
96. Id.




101. Id.; see generally Case CO/8819/d2006, Cemex UK Cement Ltd. v. Dep't for Env't,
Food & Rural Affairs, [2006] EWHC (Admin.) 3207 (QB) (holding that the method for
allocating needs to consider "all commissioning phases in the baseline period").
102. Bowden, supra note 10, at 108.
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jected and the court denied their argument of discrimination.1 0 3
III. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
A. PLANNING/IMPEThUS/HiSTORY
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was designed to
function as "a cooperative effort ... to reduce carbon dioxide emissions
from power plants through the implementation of a linked CO 2 [b]udget
[t]rading [p]rogram by each [p]articipating [s]tate.' 10 4 The RGGI is an
agreement among a coalition of ten states in the Northeast to reduce car-
bon dioxide pollutants. 10 5 Discussions for the program began in April
2003, when New York Governor Pataki invited the states to develop a
regional cap and trade program. 10 6 Seven states took part in outlining
the Memorandum of Understanding, which lays out the framework for
the RGGI and specifies an intention to draft a model rule in December of
2005: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York and Vermont. 10 7 The Model Rule was published in August 2006,
and created a guideline for any state seeking to join the program or im-
plement something similar.10 8 In 2007, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Maryland signed onto the Memorandum of Understanding.1 0 9
The RGGI program deals exclusively with electrical power plants. 110
But, like the European program, it allows for corporations to go out of
the power sector to reduce emissions and use those reductions as offset
credits. 1 The credit may then be used in lieu of an allowance.1 1 2 Al-
lowances may also be purchased at auction. 113 Corporations may only
emit in the amount for which they hold allowances in order to meet the
goals set by the joint efforts of the involved governments." 4 Rulemaking
for the program is now complete, and the RGGI began its first compli-
ance period on January 1, 2009.115
The RGGI intends to stabilize emissions at their current levels by 2014
103. Id.
104. Auction Notice, RGGI, Auction Notice for CO2 Allowance Auction 2 on Decem-
ber 17, 2008, 1 (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://rggi.org/about/history/
oldauctionnotices.
105. Note, The Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1958, 1958 (2007) (examining the potential problems for the RGGI under the
Compact Clause as a question of states functioning jointly in the stead of Congress).
106. Id. at 1959.
107. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) C02 Budget Trading Program-His-
tory, http://rggi.org/about/history (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
108. Id.
109. Id.




113. Harrison & Radov, supra note 52, at 260.
114. Westerfield et al., supra note 50, at 187 (statement of Frank Litz, Senior Fellow,
World Resources Inst.).
115. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI C02 Budget Trading Program-His-
tory, supra note 107.
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and then to begin to reduce them 10% by 2018.116 The program plans to
use the cap to reduce emissions; currently, the cap is set at 188 million
tons of carbon dioxide for the ten participating states. 1" 7 The states will
then use the revenues from the auctions to support investment in a green
economy, relying on the notion that "[c]lean-technology innovation and
deployment will increase energy independence, keep wealth in local
economies and create green-collar jobs. RGGI will provide a market sig-
nal that the cost of emitting carbon must now be incorporated into energy
pricing." 118 As such, one of the main goals for the program is to
"[p]romote energy independence" by cutting back on energy use and en-
couraging energy efficiency, "[b]ecause the cheapest power plant is the
one that never gets built ... ."119 RGGI also plans to serve as a "model
for a national program to reduce CO2 emissions. '"120
B. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which outlines the basic
principles and goals of the program, was signed in December 2005.121
First, it recognizes that each state involved has an individual environmen-
tal policy, acknowledging that the regional program only affirms and ad-
vances, rather than replaces, any existing state policy efforts.1 22 It also
recognizes the "scientific consensus" that human activity has an impact
on temperature through greenhouse gas emission and the risks thus im-
plied.1 23 The MOU also reaffirms the goals of the program-energy effi-
ciency, energy independence, policy leadership, and quick action. 2 4 It
creates a system in which the allowances may be traded between entities
in the participating states.'25
The MOU further deals with the issues of safety valves and offsets.
The safety valve is "triggered" by a market event which causes the price
of allocations to exceed a predetermined value, extending the compliance
period to accommodate these shifts.126 Similar to the EU ETS, the pro-
gram allows for corporations to earn offset allowances when they engage
in projects for emissions reductions. 27 Offset projects must be in the
United States, with projects in the signatory states valued twice as
highly. 28 Offset credits, however, may only be used to a maximum of
116. Harrison & Radov, supra note 52, at 260.
117. RGGI Executive Summary, http://rggi.org/docs/RGGIExecutiveSummary.pdf
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3.3% of the reported emissions. 129
The document sets out each state's emissions cap. 130 It makes clear
that each state may then determine the distribution of allowances within
its own borders. 31 Although, 25% of allowances must be for a consumer
benefit or strategic energy purpose, including promoting energy effi-
ciency, mitigating rate impacts, promoting renewable and greener energy
technologies, encouraging investment in carbon abatement technologies,
and funding the costs of membership in the RGGI program. a32 The
MOU also provides that "[t]he banking of allowances, offset allowances
and early reduction credits will be allowed without limitation. 133
The MOU attempts to address the issues of electrical importing and
leakage, recognizing one of the issues that has proven most important,
and potentially detrimental, in previous cap and trade programs.134 The
attempt to minimize emissions by creating a cost in carbon is rendered
ineffective by the ability to cross convenient state lines to create a power
source and then ship that power into a member state.135 The MOU cre-
ates a working group to study the issues of leakage, potential ways to
address the problem, and the factors that may contribute to leakage.1 36
The states also will attempt to monitor electricity imports during the pro-
gram.137 The MOU further gives the signatory states the power to take
steps to address and mitigate leakage problems during the life of the pro-
gram. 138 In recognition of their role at the forefront of carbon trading in
America, the states agree to advocate for a federal program that will "re-
ward[ ] states that are first movers. 1 39 If a national plan is adopted, the
states will transition into that program. 140 Lastly, the MOU ends with a
charge to the states to maintain programs and policies within their own
borders that will minimize emissions and promote energy efficiency
"while maintaining economic growth."'14 1
C. MODEL RULE
The Model Rule was created as a legislative guide for states joining the
RGGI to provide consistency in statutory process and guidelines through-
out the program: "The model rule provides a set of regulations for the
structure and function of RGGI. Each state that intends to participate in
129. Id. at 5.
130. Note, supra note 105, at 1960.
131. Id.
132. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 64, at 6.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 9.
135. See Note, supra note 105, at 1965 (discussing leakage).
136. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 64, at 9.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 11.
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RGGI must adopt this rule through legislation or regulation. 1 42 The
Model Rule reaffirms the goals of the program and, consequently, makes
them a part of each member state's own body of law.143 Due to the scope
of this Comment and the volume of the Rule, laid out below are the pro-
visions that most directly apply to liability under the statute and owner-
ship of the allocation asset. The Rule provides a section of definitions. It
includes a definition for "allocation":
[t]he determination by the REGULATORY AGENCY [of the sig-
natory state] of the number of CO 2 allowances to be initially credited
to a CO 2 budget unit, an allocation set-aside account, the consumer
benefit or strategic energy purpose account, or the general account
of the sponsor of an approved CO 2 emissions offset project.144
The Rule specifically defines "CO2 allowance" as:
[a] limited authorization by the REGULATORY AGENCY under
the CO 2 Budget Trading Program to emit up to one ton of C0 2, sub-ject to all applicable limitations contained in this Part. No provision
of this regulation shall be construed to limit the authority of the
REGULATORY AGENCY to terminate or limit such authorization
to emit. This limited authorization does not constitute a property
right.' 45
The Model Rule also addresses the issue of liability. 146 It states that no
revisions to the Model Rule will be retroactive, so as to function to ex-
cuse prior violations of the enacted statute.' 47 Additionally, it makes
clear that any owner of an emissions source shall be liable, to the provi-
sions of the program that would apply to the source in question. 148
Clearly, it states that complying with the RGGI does not supply any kind
of safe harbor for corporations as to other laws or regulations. 49
D. THE AUCTION
The style of auction chosen to initiate the cap and trade program under
the RGGI was designed with several goals in mind-to be:
[f]ow [on] administrative costs, low [on] transaction costs for bidders;
[p]erceived as fair, transparent, and understandable to participants
and the public; [e]conomically efficient-that is, getting allowances
to those who value them the most; [a]voiding collusive behavior by
bidders and providing good signals about market prices; [h]elping to
minimize price volatility; [r]aising reasonable revenues from the sale
142. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Releases Final Model Rule: Pew Center on
Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/node/4840 (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).










of a valuable public asset; and [c]ompatible with existing electricity
and energy markets. 150
An applicant must be approved to bid at an auction. Previous approval
will authorize a bidder for future auctions, though their approval must be
ratified by any states who have joined the program since their ap-
proval. 151 A new applicant must complete and submit the Qualification
Application and Intent to Bid forms;152 meet all financial security re-
quirements prior to the auction; 153 and is allowed to bid when the appli-
cant maintains a general or compliance account with the RGGI auction
allowance tracking system.154 All purchased allowances are transferred
to this account. 155 Once accounts are established, an account representa-
tive may freely move allowances between both general and compliance
accounts.
156
Bidders must have a Primary Authorized Auction Representative
(PAAR) to represent the applicant through the auction process and serve
as the primary contact for the auction process.1 5 7 The PAAR must be an
employee of the applicant and it is recommended that the applicant use
the same person for the CO 2 Allowance Tracking System (COATS) as
well.158 An applicant may also have a Secondary Authorized Auction
Representative (SAAR), who need not be an employee, but may re-
present the applicant during the auction process. 159 An account repre-
sentative may also represent more than one potential bidder. 60 When
dual representing, the applicants must disclose either any corporate or
bidding associations.16 1 Also, representatives "must ensure that only au-
thorized persons act on behalf of an [a]pplicant."'1 62
Prior to auction, an applicant must present financial security.1 63 The
financial security sets the maximum the applicant is allowed to bid for
allowances. 164 There are three acceptable forms of security: "(1) a bond
issued by a financial institution with a United States banking license, (2)
cash in the form of a wire transfer or certified funds, such as a certified
bank check or cashier's check, or (3) an irrevocable letter of credit."'1 65
150. J. Jared Snyder, Auction Design for Selling C02 Emission Allowances Under the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, in GLOBAL WARMING: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
LAW 223, 239-40 (ALI/N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 2007).
151. Auction Notice, supra note 104, at 3, 6.
152. Id. at 3.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 4.
155. Id.
156. Id.











An applicant for the auction cannot release confidential information
relating to the auction and its position therein, including "qualification
status, bidding strategy, bid price and/or bid quantity information, and
information on financial security to the extent such information is not
generally available to the public."'1 66 The applicant has the obligation to
make sure that its advisors maintain the same confidence. 167
A market monitor is retained by the RGGI.168 The monitor serves as
an independent watchdog over the auction and provides ongoing moni-
toring of allowance holdings and transactions. 169 The monitor also
watches over bidder behavior and must report what "may have a material
impact on the . . . performance of the auction" to the member states.170
In conjunction with that monitoring, "[a]ny fraudulent, misleading, ma-
nipulative, collusive, or noncompetitive behavior in a CO2 [a]llowance
[a]uction or in the CO 2 allowance market may be investigated and prose-
cuted in accordance with any and all applicable regulations and laws.' 71
The format of the auction is uniform-price and sealed bids. 172 "[B]ids
are.., ranked by bid price from high to low," with "demand... noted at
each bid" price.' 73 With this information, a determination is made as to
the clearing price, and the carbon dioxide allowances are awarded ac-
cording to specific scenarios. 174 The clearing price becomes the reserve
price if total demand can be accommodated by the supply of allowances
offered up in the auction, and all bids within that range will be awarded
their requested allowances. 75 If the supply of available allowances can-
not meet the demand at auction and there is a bid level at which the
amount of requests equals the demand, allowances will be given to those
who bid greater than the clearing price. 176 But, if the demand at no point
equals the available allowances, "the clearing price is the bid price of the
marginal bid(s).' 77 Allowances will then be awarded to all offers greater
than that. 178 Further, any available allowances will be given to marginal
bids when there is a single marginal bid at the clearing price and the sup-
ply available to satisfy it, or by a random process when there are multiple
bids in that situation. 179 Any offers that are in the system at the time the
auction closes will be considered "binding offers and eligible for
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award." 180 As such, the program does not allow contingent bids.181
Bidders can submit as many bids as they feel are necessary to meet
their emissions needs, but should submit a single bid at each given
price.182 Until the window for bidding closes, bidders may cancel or
change their bids at will.183 Bids should be submitted in multiples of 1,000
and in U.S. dollars and cents.184
There are a number of situations that will result in a rejected bid.185
The bid must be at or above the reserve price.1 86 The amount of the bid
must be completely backed up by the bidder's offered financial security-
the maximum available amount that the bidder may offer. 187 No corpo-
ration, on its own or in conjunction with relevant associates, may bid for
more than 25% of the allowances offered for sale.' 88
Associations are relevant as to this requirement when the relationship
is one where the parties may act in concert and when that relationship
would preclude them from competing against each other at auction. 189
Therefore, "corporate associations must be reported in the [Qualification
Application]."1 90 "An applicant has a 'direct corporate association' with
another" potential bidder, when the latter has "more than 20% of any
class of listed shares, the right [or option] to acquire such shares" or when
the latter "[h]olds or can appoint more than 20% of common directors,
holds voting power, or controls the [a]pplicant's affairs through some
other means."'19 An indirect corporate association is established if a bid-
der has a direct relationship "with another party that has a direct corpo-
rate association with [an a]pplicant," or through other such indirect lines
of associations.' 92 Applicants must also disclose relationships where a
party is "concerned" with the applicant's bidding.' 93 This is established
when the party:
[a]greed to provide assistance with financing [i]s partnered with the
Applicant for bidding purposes [h]as entered into any explicit or im-
plicit agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind relat-
ing to the CO 2 allowances offered for sale at an auction [h]as agreed
to provide assistance in any other way with the exception of invest-
ment or auction advisory services. 194
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if [that] party is concerned with the Applicant's bid. 1 95 The RGGI sug-
gests that whether a bidding association is necessary to disclose on the
application may be discovered by answering the following questions: "(1)
Does the Applicant have a bidding association with another party? (2)
Does another Applicant have a bidding association with the Applicant?
(3) Does another entity or person have a bidding association with the
Applicant?" 196
After the auction is completed and the allocations thus determined, a
bidder is notified of its award through e-mail.' 97 The total cost of the
allocation must be paid or the financial security will be used to meet the
obligations, so payment commences immediately. 198 The allocation is
transferred into the RGGI COATS account. 199 The contract is then com-
plete and fulfilled, except in Maryland where there must be a contract for
sale in conjunction with the auction writings.200
E. TYPICAL CONTRACT-THE ERPA
Within the commodities trading scheme, carbon allowances are cur-
rently trading "over the counter," not via any form of formal exchange.20 1
The contract used is an Emissions Reductions Purchase Agreement
(ERPA), which establishes the relationship between the bank trading the
allocation and the party purchasing it.202 Like in other market relation-
ships, the bank is functioning as a "middle man" and the party is the "end
user."203 The ERPA was created by the International Emissions Trading
Association (IETA) "to establish a functional international framework
for trading greenhouse gas emissions reductions. ' 20 4 The "IETA focuses
on the creation of systems and instruments that will ensure effective busi-
ness participation. '20 5 The ERPA and the IETA's work has focused
largely on "the objectives of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change and ultimately climate protection" 20 6 and, though its
mission has focused globally and in conjunction with the international
jurisdiction of the United Nations, its work has not had the opportunity
to take hold in the United States.
195. Id. at 21.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 22.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 23.
200. Id. at 24.
201. Westerfield et al., supra note 50, at 189 (statement of Jeff King, Credit Suisse).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement, Int'l Emissions Trading Ass'n (Sept.
11, 2006), available at http://www.ieta.org/itea/www/pages/index.php?idSitePage=203.
205. Id.
206. About IETA, http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/index.php?IdSiteTree=2 (last




The RGGI program and the programs initiated on the West Coast
highlight the void of federal action in the area of climate change legisla-
tion and carbon emissions controls.20 7 Though the United States signed
onto the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 20 8
the failure to sign onto the Kyoto Protocol and to create a mandatory
emissions reduction program20 9 has left states and local governments to
try to address the issue themselves. 210 Kevin Doran and Alaine Gin-
nochio point out that there are some advantages to state-directed efforts,
but without a coherent federal policy, corporations and policymakers are
forced to work under a "patchwork" of programs.211 More risky is the
problem of leakage creating a "race to the bottom" where states that do
not regulate emissions end up having an economic advantage over those
that follow regulations.21 2 Joseph Allan MacDougald describes the situa-
tion as state regulations "perversely" giving an advantage to unrestricted
sources that do not have the added cost of complying with the
regulations.2 1 3
Because of the clear variation in state and federal policies on green-
house gas emissions, some scholars, including Joseph Allan MacDougald,
have questioned whether states have the right to form programs like the
RGGI at all. 214 By joining together and creating a coalition of states with
a unified policy, the states are stepping into the powers guaranteed to
Congress under the Commerce Clause. 215 Congress has the power "to
regulate commerce among the states." 2 16 Generally, the Supreme Court
has invalidated laws of one state that penalize or tax the goods imported
from another state.217 The problem for RGGI and similar programs
arises with the issue of managing leakage.2 18 To prevent leakage, it would
be helpful to be able to tax or otherwise penalize those who purchase
"uncapped power. '2 19 The entrance of unregulated power into the regu-
lated market disturbs the allocation of allowances and their price. 220 The
market for allocations would be destroyed if a cheaper and less regulated
alternative was available.2 21 A carbon allocation is a good-electrical
power is electrical power, regardless of its source and the location of that
207. MacDougald, supra note 14, at 1422-34.
208. Doran & Ginnochio, supra note 16, at 51.
209. Id. at 52.
210. Id. at 53-54; MacDougald, supra note 14, at 1433-34.
211. Doran & Ginnochio, supra note 16, at 55.
212. Id. at 55-56; MacDougald, supra note 14, at 1435.
213. MacDougald, supra note 14, at 1431.
214. Id. at 1450.
215. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
216. MacDougald, supra note 14, at 1439.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1437.
219. Id. at 1444.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1445.
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source.2 22 Like the cases where the Supreme Court has struck down state
regulations as violating the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Court would
likely find that a monetary penalty for leakage is unconstitutional be-
cause the tax is imposed merely because of the origin of the good and not
because of its character.223 However, the counter-argument may be that
power produced at a regulated source is inherently different from power
produced at an unregulated source. Perhaps consumers are not willing to
endure the costs of unregulated emissions, and the states are trying to
protect their populations from the unseen costs.
The burgeoning American carbon market may not suffer under such
differing programs for much longer, since at the time of publication, the
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 has been passed by the
House and is under consideration by the Senate. 224 This Act would cre-
ate a federal cap and trade system for managing carbon emissions. 225 The
initial focus of federal regulation would be on power plants, like the
RGGI, but it would also include factories and refineries.2 26 Though the
program was built on the foundation previously laid by the RGGI, previ-
ous American systems, and the European model for carbon cap and
trade, it will also impact the RGGI if passed.227
IV. THE CARBON ASSET
The invisible nature of the carbon or emissions asset is what makes
determining its nature and costs so difficult. Some have advocated that
the costs associated with pollutants and invisible assets such as electricity,
fossil fuels, and emissions are much greater than what we actually see in
the marketplace.2 28 These advocates believe that energy prices should
include a calculation of the other costs to societal health and well-being
and to the environment. 229 But even with some remotely concrete
formula, it is difficult to determine the ultimate costs, especially when
there is not a consensus on what should be considered a part of that
cost-what should go into the formula. It also remains undetermined
what the asset actually is-whether it is a property right, a good, a ser-
vice, a tax, a government permit, a commodity, a currency, or a security.
It is necessary to determine what the allocation will be in order to under-
222. Id. (noting the logic of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629
(1978)).
223. Id. at 1446 (citing West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 204 n.20
(1994)).
224. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009). A similar bill was initiated by the Senate.
225. The American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey Bill): Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, http://www.pewclimate.org/acesa (last visited Oct. 31,
2009); Posting of Brian Nearing to Green Blog, http://blog.timesunion.com/green/this-
weekend-on-capital-green-scene-22/992/ (July 3, 2009, 13:43 EST).
226. Posting of Brian Nearing, supra note 225.
227. Id.





stand the repercussions that owning and trading the asset will have from a
legal and, in particular, a contractual point of view. The nature of the
asset will also be key for corporations trying to make investment choices.
Determination of the type of asset sets the parameters of ownership,
methods of enforcing ownership, and methods of challenging ownership.
The unique qualities of the asset and the legal parameters in existence
must be used to determine its nature and legal value. Furthermore, ade-
quate protections for the rights and values associated with the asset must
be supplied in order to provide the incentives necessary for the market-
driven cap and trade program to function. Though its goals may be asso-
ciated with environmental standards, this mechanism, its impetus, and
driving forces are essentially purely market reliant. Market forces must
be preserved, though regulated, in order for the system to attain its goal.
A. POLLUTANTS AS AN ASSET
Emissions allocations are a government-created "right. '2 30 The notion
of "right" in this context, though, disguises some of the issues inherent in
discovering what type of asset is created by the government-implemented
cap and trade system. It could, possibly more accurately, be called a
"permit" or the typical "allowance" or "credit." "Right," however, fol-
lows the nomenclature often used, which reiterates that once a carbon
allowance or cap and trade program is implemented, there is no way to
legally emit those pollutants without conforming to the rights and inter-
ests created by the system. 231 Further, the interest created has value in
the marketplace. 232 The notion of "right" in this situation, though, is con-
founded by the fact that prior to the introduction of a regulation or stat-
ute determining that allocations are necessary, sources may, presumably,
emit freely into the un-owned atmosphere. 233 So, in one way, the statute
creates a right that did not previously exist-the right to emit legally
under the newly implemented statute. From this point of view, it is a
completely new government-created right when limited in terms of the
statute imposing the system. On the other hand, though, the government
is taking away a right by requiring permission and even financial outlay
or exchange to perform an act that was previously without government or
regulatory interference.
Interestingly, the Model Rule states specifically that an allocation
should not be seen as a "property right," limiting the potential interpreta-
tions of the asset without supplying other nomenclature or categorization
for the interest created.2 34 This statement may, instead, be an attempt to
230. See generally Jillian Button, Carbon: Commodity or Currency? The Case for an
International Carbon Market Based on the Currency Model, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 571
(2008) (providing excellent background on the nature of the carbon as an asset and ulti-
mately advocating the carbon asset as a form of currency).
231. Id. at 571.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MODEL RULE R. XX-1.2(k).
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deny the way the right is already developing as a kind of property. Cur-
rently, those in the business of trading commodities are trading al-
lowances on familiar ground, as commodities.2 35 In fact, the allocations
are being handled by the commodity departments of banks and invest-
ment houses, 236 which supports the notion that people with expertise in
the field of commodities are the appropriate people to handle the negoti-
ations involving emissions allocations trading. Also, this appears to as-
sume that the market for allocations will evolve into a market that is
more closely related to the market for commodities than to the markets
for typical consumer goods, UCC goods, securities, stocks, or currencies.
B. THE AMERICAN QUESTION: CARBON TAX
Before the question of the carbon asset is addressed, it is necessary to
address the argument now raging in American politics-carbon tax ver-
sus cap and trade. As the likelihood of an American cap and trade sys-
tem has increased under the Obama administration, the cap and trade
debate has hit the mainstream. Many opponents of the system have
sought to recast the debate into a question of tax. Some advocates be-
lieve that a carbon tax is the appropriate mechanism for limiting carbon
emissions.237 One commentator believes that a carbon tax would provide
a clearly defined mechanism necessary to successfully regulate emis-
sions.238 Moreover, a carbon tax would provide a defined and definite
source of revenue, whereas the cap and trade system lacks certainty and
instead, is dependent on market whims.239 The resort to a carbon tax is
also based on the seeming inability to determine the nature of the carbon
asset and the desire to try to placate political opponents. 240 But the car-
bon tax suggestion also comes from an effort to head off the potential
boom and bust cycles that come with the creation of a new market. 241
Lastly, this commentator points out that the carbon tax may help the
American market avoid the problems that have confronted the European
cap and trade system.242 Those who advance the carbon tax program also
235. Button, supra note 230, at 575. Black's Law Dictionary provides the following defi-
nition for commodities:
Those things which are useful or serviceable, particularly articles of merchan-
dise moveable in trade. Goods, wares, and merchandise of any kind; articles
of trade or commerce. Movable articles of value; things that are bought and
sold. This word is a broader term than merchandise, and, in referring to com-
merce may include almost any article of movable or personal property.
Staples such as wool, cotton, etc. which are traded on a commodity exchange
and on which there is trading in futures.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 274 (6th ed. 1990).
236. Button, supra not 230, at 575.
237. Posting of Timothy B. Hurst to Red Green and Blue, 6 Reasons a Carbon Tax is
Better than Cap and Trade, http://redgreenandblue.org/2009/07/17/6-reasons-a-carbon-tax-








point out the failings in the European cap and trade system, noting that
the prices for carbon permits have not maintained a level sufficient to
make the carbon permit appropriately scarce or punitive.2 43 Perhaps,
though, the advantage to a straight carbon tax is best explained by Repre-
sentative John B. Larson: "The American people want us to level with
them .... We create price certainty without any new bureaucracies or
complicated auction schemes. '
244
Though the argument for a carbon tax has some advantage in terms of
clarity, the simple nature of a carbon tax, or "cap and tax," sabotages the
system by its nature. It lacks political muster in two ways: (1) passing
large-scale taxes is consistently politically impossible, and (2) failing to
provide a market mechanism for regulation.245 Representative Edward J.
Markey noted that there are arguments in favor of a carbon tax, "but
[that] politics is the art of the possible, and [he] think[s] cap-and-trade is
possible. '2 46 Certainly, at some level this argument is superficial. First,
there is the mere question of semantics-calling cap and trade a "carbon
tax" because it is politically expedient to tie an opponent's system to the
universally-hated notion of taxes. There is also the question of political
feasibility: a cap and trade system capitalizes on American notions of cap-
italism while a carbon tax sends hints of socialism and domineering en-
vironmentalism to the electorate. Generally, it indeed would seem that a
cap and trade system for practical and political reasons is more likely to
find firm footing than a, perhaps clearer, carbon tax. Moreover, as
pointed out by some analysts, a tax system is easily gamed and will not
lead to the solid and consistent regulation created by a market-based cap
and trade system. 247 In order for a cap and trade system to truly work, it
must create an asset that is defined and that carries inherent, but negotia-
ble, value in a transaction.
C. THE USUAL DEBATE: CURRENCY OR COMMODITY?
Previous arguments about the nature of the carbon asset have failed to
focus on the ownership privileges innate in the asset, to allow for the
development of contractual relationships, and to relate to the current atti-
tude towards legal control over economic markets. For example, Jillian
Button argues that we should not jump to the pure "commodification of
carbon;" rather, we should look to carbon as a currency as well as, or
even in lieu of, a commodity. 2 48 Button cautions that without a given
determination as to the nature of the carbon asset and the nature of the
market, those buying and selling the allocation will seize the opportunity
243. Id.
244. John M. Broder, House Bill for a Carbon Tax to Cut Emissions Faces a Steep
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to determine its nature themselves. 249 I agree with Button that there
should be a defined nature to the asset created by the carbon allowance,
but I suggest examining the contractual advantages of seeing the carbon
asset under the classification of commodity and even as a UCC-defined
good.
The currency model suggests that in order to maintain government pre-
dominance and control over the carbon asset and to insure that the envi-
ronmental goals of cap and trade programs are met, the carbon asset
should not be regulated like a commodity, but rather, like a currency. 250
Button's notion is echoed in a New York Times article making the as-
sumption that "[t]o build a carbon market, its originators must create a
currency of carbon credits that participants can trade."' 251 The jump to a
currency qualification does not seem to address the fact that government
mechanisms for commodities trading already exist in the United States
and abroad. The United States provides for the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) to "regulate commodity futures and option
markets. '252 Though it was initially focused on agricultural products, the
CFTC has since expanded to include other industries and even created an
Energy and Environmental Markets Advisory Committee (formerly the
Energy Markets Advisory Committee) in 2008.253 This committee has
been mandated to advise the CFTC "on important new developments in
energy and environmental futures markets that may raise new regulatory
issues[ ] and the appropriate regulatory response to ensure market integ-
rity and competition[ ] and protect consumers. '254 Here, there is the po-
tential for an existing mechanism to expand in order govern the rights
exchanged in emissions transactions. Additionally, this method would be
provided in a way that is familiar to the entities involved in emissions
trading-the corporations, the bankers, and the traders-and would take
advantage of clear precedent and developed understanding of enforce-
ment opportunities. Overall, it is more consistent with the mission of the
cap and trade system to use existing market forces to enforce an environ-
mental benefit.
Button argues that there are advantages to a currency model that can-
not be captured by a commodities classification.25 5 She looks to a cur-
rency model to avoid pricing discrepancies across different markets and
to drive "down the price of units across the market,... resulting in lower
overall GHG mitigation. '256 Using a currency model would allow for
carbon allowance prices to be traded across national lines with variation
249. Id. at 573, 575.
250. Id. at 573.
251. Hannah Fairfield, When Carbon is Currency, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, § 6, at 6.
252. About the CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/aboutthecftc/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31,
2009).
253. Energy Markets Advisory Committee, http://www.cftc.gov/aboutthecftc/Energy
andEnvironmentalMarketsAdvisoryCommittee/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
254. Id.
255. Button, supra note 230, at 583-95.
256. Id. at 584.
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allowed in each allocation's price difference representing the cost differ-
ences in minimizing emissions.2 57 This model would also include more
parties in the emissions program instead of excluding those who do not
meet a single standard or sacrificing the overall goals.258 Button further
argues that using a currency model would help in "creating a race to the
top" as opposed to a race to the bottom. 259 She suggests that "[i]n a
homogenous commodity model, market forces would pose the risk of
causing a race to the bottom, because regulators would be lobbied by
companies to make it easier to create excess credits. 2
60
The currency market adds some form of protection to the carbon al-
lowance market to guarantee that the goals of the system are met. The
currency approach certainly is focused on increasing the regulatory ac-
tions in governments and the participation of global emitters at any
level.2 61 However, a considerable measure of market freedom is sacri-
ficed, and the power of existing government regulation practices in the
commodities arena is overlooked. It makes little sense to rely on a mar-
ket-created mechanism to solve a problem and to bring along corporate
players, while at the same time limiting those market forces. Addition-
ally, a currency model does not acknowledge that the more complex and
limiting the regulatory schema, the less politically expedient the program.
In the current economic climate, corporations certainly are quickly be-
coming accustomed to increased government involvement, but this in-
volvement is more easily accepted and compliance is more easily
obtained when that regulation flows naturally from that which existed
before. By continuing with the commodities analogy, investors are able
to continue their involvement in the cap and trade program with minimal
increased costs and, hopefully, maximum understanding and willingness.
D. A NEW WAY OF SEEING THINGS: FROM COMMODITY TO GOOD
Limiting the addition of currency qualities to the carbon allocation
does not preclude the government from controlling the asset. Instead,
such limitation allows for the possibility of government control while al-
lowing for the predominance of contract law and the responsible weight
of market forces. Even Button recognizes the innate similarities between
carbon allowances and commodities:
[C]arbon units can be traded like generic goods... [and] are gener-
ally made in very large volumes .... The prices of commodities are
fluid across time, but at any given time the price for a particular com-
modity will be generally uniform across the marketplace .... Carbon
futures markets have also emerged, similar to those tied to tradi-
257. Id. at 585-87.
258. See id. at 586 (discussing a "binary" approach to carbon trading).
259. Id. at 588-90.
260. Id. at 589-90.
261. See id. at 581 (explaining that private organizations in unregulated markets will




Here, she has not only recognized the potential for carbon allowances to
be treated like commodities, but also that they may be treated like "ge-
neric goods. '263 It is important, however, to recognize the potential for
carbon allowances to be treated as a good and to examine the potential
benefits of such a treatment.
Providing a useful analogy to this discussion, some American circuits
have held that electricity is a good as defined by the UCC.264 Like car-
bon dioxide emissions, electricity is an invisible asset.265 It is naturally
occurring, yet harnessed by man. In fact, the two are naturally coupled in
the realm of emissions regulated by the RGGI because electricity and
carbon dioxide emissions are produced in the same place by the same
sources. Electricity is the product desired by the marketplace, and emis-
sions are the negative externality released into the air as a
consequence. 266
The UCC applies to "transactions in goods. ' 26 7 Once a contract or
transaction is deemed to be governed by the UCC, there are certain ad-
vantages and disadvantages with contractual interpretation and
enforcement.
The UCC defines "goods" as:
all things ... which are movable at the time of identification to the
contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be
paid, investment securities . . . and things in action. "Goods" also
includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops .... 268
Courts, though, generally are split on whether electricity is a good or a
service.269 The District Court for the Southern District of New York,
while construing Utah law, recognized that Utah courts "have held that
other states' interpretations of identical UCC provisions are relevant" in
determining undefined provisions of electricity contracts. 270 The Utah
courts, though, have not explicitly held that electricity is a good under the
262. Id. at 576-77 (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 576.
264. See generally Morrison & Foerester LLP, Electricity: A "Good" under the UCC.
Should be a Simple Question-Right?, FREE LIBRARY Apr. 21, 2005, http://www.thefree
library.com/Electricity:+At%22Good %22under+the+UCC.+Should+be+at+Simple+Ques-
tion+-. . .-ao131874846 (providing a comparison of cases delving into the issue of whether
electricity is a good under the UCC). This article provided the original comparison of cases
addressing electricity as a UCC good that inspired this section.
265. Id.
266. Button, supra note 230, at 571; Lehner, supra note 34, at 388.
267. U.C.C. § 2-102 (noting also that the UCC shall not apply to securities
transactions).
268. U.C.C. § 2-105(1).
269. Morrison & Foerester LLP, supra note 264.
270. Enron Power Mktg., Inc. v. Nev. Power Co., No. 03 Civ. 9318, 9332 (BSJ), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20351, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2004) (reviewing a bankruptcy court
decision granting summary judgment on breach of contract claims for Nevada Power Co.).
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UCC.27 1 The New York court has also applied the UCC, particularly
UCC section 2-609, the "Right to Adequate Assurance of Perform-
ance." 272 In so doing, it is able to use a unique "mechanism[,] . . . a UCC
innovation designed to solve the problem of anticipatory breach. '273 The
court is then able to employ the methods of interpretation and remedies
provided by the UCC that would have not been available to it had it
determined that electricity was not governed by the UCC. Using these
kinds of UCC "mechanisms" will allow for greater contract enforcement
and for increased predictability in carbon allowance contracting and liti-
gation. Most importantly, a carbon allowance must be given a real and
legally protected value in order for corporations to engage in their trade
and market mechanisms to control the carbon asset.
In Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., for example,
the District Court for the Northern District of California also faced with
the question of whether electricity would qualify as a good under the
UCC.274 The court ultimately determined that electricity does qualify as
a good and that the UCC would rightfully apply, but recognized the split
among circuits. 275 Some courts have been of the opinion that "[t]he dis-
tribution might well be a service, but the electricity itself, in the contem-
plation of the ordinary user, is a consumable product. '276 The Puget
Sound court also noted that a Texas court made a similar determination,
stating that "'[e]lectricity is a commodity, which, like other goods, can be
manufactured, transported and sold." 277 In looking at the facts in ques-
tion, after surveying the determinations of other courts, the holding here
summarized that:
[s]imply put, electricity in this instance is a thing movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale. That is clearly demon-
strated by the fact that the Agreement calls for the shipment of spe-
cific quantities of electricity. The electricity is moved through the
power lines and the amounts are metered and therefore identifiable.
The court will apply the UCC.278
The Supreme Court of New York, however, took the opposite line of
reasoning and determined that electricity was a service rather than a
271. Power Sys. & Controls, Inc. v. Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 10 n.2 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) (noting also that other jurisdictions recognize that "the sale of electricity is
considered a good, and UCC Article 2 governs"); Enron Power Mktg., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20351, at *4-5 (citing Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp., 705 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1998); Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No.
C-01-2451 MHP, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1350 (N.D. Cal. Jan 4., 2002)).
272. Enron Power Mktg., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20351, at *4.
273. Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-609).
274. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1350, at *16.
275. Id. at *28.
276. Id. at *29 (quoting Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 166 Cal. App. 3d 68, 82 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985)) (emphasis added).
277. Id. at *30 (quoting Grant v. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 20 S.W.3d 764, 771 (Tex. App.
2000) (emphasis added).
278. Id. at *32.
2009] 1941
SMU LAW REVIEW
"'product' for purposes of strict products liability. ' 279 The power com-
pany conceded that a damaging surge was caused when a limb fell on a
power line and brought the distribution line down onto the transmission
line.280 The court here recognized that other jurisdictions have consid-
ered electricity as a product once it has "passed through the customer's
electric meter ... because it has been placed in the stream of commerce
and is no longer under the control of the supplier. '281 The court dis-
agreed with that notion, furthering a point made by the Ohio court that
"[tlhe utility does not 'manufacture' electrically charged particles, 'but
rather, sets in motion the necessary elements that allow the flow of elec-
tricity."' 282 The court analogized electricity more closely to services in
that consumers pay by the kilowatt hour and for the "use of the electric-
ity."' 283 Here, though, the court limited its decision by considering the
policy implications behind only strict products liability.284 The decision
did not look at other implications for considering electricity a good, espe-
cially the potential advantages in contracts litigation.
The decision did address one of the important caveats worth consider-
ing in determining the nature of the carbon asset. Quoting the Ohio
court, the New York court "point[s] out that the public utility does not
operate in a free market. ' 285 Similarly, carbon emissions do not operate
in a completely free market, but rather, contingent to government permit
allocations. 286 Conversely, the ultimate goal of the program, though, re-
lies on the power of free market forces. In order for the program to
work, corporations must be encouraged, brought on board, and able to
see the risks and benefits in the carbon transactions that they would see
in normal market transactions. Essentially, there is a two-layer factor of
political expediency here: the need to create a program that will actually
be accurate and the need to encourage corporate involvement. The an-
swer is innate to the cap and trade notion itself, simply put, using the
natural play of the market.
To make the market function though, security must be added to the
value of the asset, which is more likely to hold firm when the contracts
treat the asset as something with a real tangible value, like a good. It is
279. Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 183 A.D.2d 293, 294, 297 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992).
280. Id. at 294.
281. Id. at 296-97 (citing Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Colo.
1987)).
282. Id. at 297 (quoting Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ohio
1988)).
283. Id. at 294.
284. Id. at 297-98 ("We also find the analysis of the Ohio court compelling insofar as it
concerns the public policy considerations behind strict products liability .... It is doubtful
whether the imposition of strict liability would lead to a safer distribution system." (inter-
nal quotations omitted)).
285. Id. at 298 (quoting Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 841-42).
286. Brett Frischmann, Using the Multi-Layered Nature of International Emissions
Trading and of International-Domestic Legal Systems to Escape a Multi-State Compliance
Dilemma, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 472 (2001).
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not a stretch to imagine the secondary trading of carbon allocations
would be similar to that seen in electricity transactions. In Puget Sound,
the court looked to how the product would be used "in the contemplation
of the ordinary user. '287 Here, the ordinary user is not the average Joe
buying the good at Wal-Mart but another corporation attempting to le-
gally emit carbon. Two corporations involved in this sort of transaction
would want to see it as something which falls within their normal realm of
business trading-not the buying and selling of some currency, but the
buying and selling of a good or a commodity with a stated value. Further,
corporations would value the knowledge that their transactions are gov-
erned by something as regular or ordinary as the UCC. Such knowledge
would enable them to predict the results of their interactions and how
best to enforce their rights under these transactions.
Though some courts reject the idea of characterizing electricity as a
good, they have not focused on typical contractual transactions, but
rather on questions of liability. It seems that when they have looked to
the enforcement of contract rights, they have been more willing to use or
analogize from the UCC. As in those instances, it would be appropriate
and beneficial to apply the rights and mechanisms available under the
UCC to carbon allocation.
V. CONCLUSION
As the world comes to terms with the reality of climate change, policy-
makers will look to innovative programs to achieve efficient and effective
progress. Utilizing market-based solutions will allow corporations to take
part in the program, rather than making them enemies of the system.
Creating methods that allow private parties to make their own determi-
nations as to cost-effective emissions reductions probably will prove suc-
cessful. When the government creates new programs and new rights,
though, new rules of contract and litigation must evolve tailored to these
new situations.
Determining what kind of asset a carbon allocation represents is key to
understanding what rights are included therein, how those rights may be
enforced, and how those rights may be challenged. There is another di-
mension to the nature of the asset, though, that may weigh more heavily
on how the future of cap and trade programs progresses. Different assets
are protected differently and subject to different kinds of government in-
tervention. As Button points out, a currency is more tightly controlled by
the government and is a creation of the government to begin with.288
Most forms of property, however, are created by government grant. The
government also has the power to take away rights to personal property,
these seizures and grants sometimes being the entire basis for popular
political movements. But ultimately, the state has the power not only to
287. Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. C-01-2451 MHP, 2002 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 1350, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2002).
288. Button, supra note 230, at 577.
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determine what rights of ownership it will give its citizens and to take
those rights away, but to craft those rights in whatever form necessary.
The importance of choosing the type of asset here may not lie com-
pletely in the personal rights of property, but may turn on how the type of
property represented will be reflected in the market created. The trading
of carbon allowances has created a new type of property in a new type of
market-one with more government influence than most, to be sure.
Governments involved in this endeavor, though, must be cautious in how
much they interfere with the market. It seems that the goals of the pro-
grams have an inherent divergence: government regulation to reduce
emissions and market mechanisms to effect that reduction. The asset
chosen will manifest the ultimate weight put on each of those factors.
